========================== Django 6.0.9 release notes ========================== *October 6, 2026* Django 6.0.9 fixes one security issue with severity "low", three security issues with severity "moderate", and provides a fix for an insufficient security mitigation in 6.0.8. It also fixes one data loss issue in 4.0. CVE-2026-77050: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``get_supported_language_variant()`` ================================================================================================= :func:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` was subject to a potential denial-of-service attack when processing many distinct, very long language codes. Language codes were used as keys in an in-memory cache before their length was limited, potentially consuming excessive process memory. To mitigate this vulnerability, language codes longer than 500 characters are now rejected or truncated before the cached lookup. This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy `. CVE-2026-84429: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in HTTP header parsing ================================================================================ ``django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters()`` was subject to a potential denial-of-service attack due to quadratic time complexity when parsing a value with many separators inside a quoted parameter. An unauthenticated request could reach this parsing through headers such as ``Accept`` or ``Content-Type``, for instance via the content negotiation performed by ``HttpRequest.accepts()``. The per-call length limit does not bound the combined size of repeated headers. The undocumented ``django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters()`` function now uses Python's :class:`email.message.Message` for parsing. As a result, parsing of some malformed or unusual header values may differ, for example, :rfc:`2231` values with a missing encoding are now decoded. This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security policy `. CVE-2026-87890: Potential request forgery via spatial lookup byte values ======================================================================== Spatial lookups accepted raster values provided as ``bytes`` without requiring them to be explicitly wrapped in :class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster`. Although these values were opened through GDAL's in-memory virtual filesystem, they could contain a VRT document referencing an external raster source. This could cause GDAL to issue network requests as the Django process user while preparing the lookup. This issue could be exploited by applications that passed attacker-controlled bytes directly to a spatial lookup. It was overlooked in the fix for CVE-2026-15307. To mitigate this issue, raster values provided as ``bytes`` must now be wrapped in :class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster` before being used in spatial lookups. Byte values representing valid hexadecimal geometries remain accepted. This is a backward incompatible change. As a reminder, all untrusted user input should be validated before use. This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security policy `. CVE-2026-87975: Privilege abuse in model formsets with editable primary keys ============================================================================ Model formsets incorrectly allowed forged ``POST`` data to either delete instances outside the limiting queryset or create instances via :ref:`edit-only ` formsets when the model's primary key could be set through the form, such as with: a ``OneToOneField`` (or parent link used as the primary key of an inline formset's model), or a natural or UUID primary key included in the form's fields. Models using the default ``BigAutoField`` primary key were not affected. This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security policy `. Bugfixes ======== * Fixed a class of bugs in Django 6.0.8 that allowed bypassing the depth limiter for deeply nested geometry collections (:cve:`2026-15830`). The new algorithm treats WKB and WKT inputs more consistently and also fixes a rare case where a valid geometry could have been rejected. * Fixed a data loss issue in Django 4.0 where :ref:`network rasters ` were deleted by GeoDjango when closed.